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1  Introduction 
1.1  Transboundary water resources management  
Water  management  first  occurred  4500  years  ago  with  the  introduction  of  water 
infrastructure. Public works were organized in ancient Egypt to clean clogged mostly 
natural, irrigation canals. The system was simple. Every Egyptian’s duty was to move 30 
cubic meters of soil a year, and local governors managed the works.
1 Moslem civilization 
introduced  sophisticated  water  courts  as  a  conflict  resolution  mechanism.  The  water 
Court  in  Valencia  still  functions  today.
2  Roman  aquaducts,  Persian  Quanats  and  16
th 
century French waterways would not have been be possible without adequate institutions 
for planning, construction and maintenance. 
People were always very creative in overcoming problems concerning water management 
and  effective  water  management  spurred  the  development  of  human  civilization.  The 
emergence of national states and the modern system of international relations produced a 
challenging new agenda – navigation on international rivers. International water treaties 
were signed to manage navigation on international rivers such as the Danube and Rhine. 
Water  law  was  a  successful  problem-solving  tool  at  that  stage  of  civilization’s 
development, but new problems were already on the horizon. 
Twentieth-century water policies relied on the construction
 of massive infrastructure in 
the form of dams, aqueducts, pipelines,
 and complex centralized treatment plants to meet 
human demands.
 These facilities brought tremendous benefits to billions of
 people, but 
they also had serious and often unanticipated social,
 economical, and ecological costs. 
Many unsolved water problems
 remain, and past approaches no longer seem sufficient. 
(Gleick P. 2003)
3 
Every substantial shift in human civilization was followed by adaptation in the water 
management sector. Water management was introduced at the dawn of the agricultural 
revolution, when people began to live sedentary lives. It became international after the 
emergence of national states and finally it became global in the previous century. There is 
no doubt the water sector will go through substantial changes in the 21
st century and the 
question is, whether transboundary water management schemes will be resilient enough 
to cope with that changes, or become vulnerable to them and fail to help humanity solve 
its water related problems. 
1.2  Complexity, uncertainty and sustainable water management 
International  watersheds  are  systems  of  interactions  and  competing  interests.  Water 
management  is,  by  definition,  conflict  management.  All  water  management  is  multi-
                                                 
1 The world’s oldest large dam was the Sadd-el-kafara dam built in Egypt between 2950 and 2690 B.C in:Butzer, K. W.(1976 ) Early 
Hydraulic Civilization in Egypt, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
2 Cosgrove1, William J.(2003) Water Security and Peace - A synthesis of studies prepared under the PCCP–Water for Peace process 
(An UNESCO–Green Cross International Initiative) 
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objective and based on navigating competing interests. The chances of finding mutually 
acceptable  solutions  drop  exponentially  as  more  stakeholders  are  involved.  Add 
international boundaries, and the chances decrease exponentially yet again. (Wolf 2006) 
Fortunately sustainable international water management can be achieved through resilient 
water institutions. This paper focuses on transboundary water institutions in particular. 
They can be defined as persistent and predictable arrangements such as treaties, laws, or 
organizational structures dealing with transboundary water  resources. Sometimes they 
posses  an  institutional  body,  like  a  river  basin  organization  and  sometimes  they  are 
merely a code or set of rules. A set of rules of water institution can be viewed as an 
analog to a genotype of a living organism and the effects of the rules or actions of joint 
institutions could be seen as an analog to a phenotype in nature.   
It is a great advantage for institutional analysis of international watersheds, to have a 
finite and comprehensive dataset of treaties as a well as an equally finite dataset of 263 
international river basins. This will allow high-precision analyses, once we reach at least 
a crude understanding of institutional and ecosystem linkages. 
Water institutions are among other things responsible for sustainable use of a shared 
transboundary resource. Sustainability (box 1) refers to the persistence and structure of 
any system; the concept is thus of central interest to both eclogists and policy analysts 
who  study  resource  use.(Constanza,  Low,  Ostrom,  Wilson  2001)
4  Even  though 
sustainability is a widely used term, it is rather difficult to define. It always takes time to 
determine, whether the pattern of use of transboundary water is sustainable or not, but we 
have a stake in biasing the outcome.
5 
Assessment  of  sustainability  always  faces  uncertainty.  Discussion  about  of  global 
climate  change  is  the  most  obvious  example.  Policy  makers  are  demanding  certain 
answers from the scientific community to form their policies, but there are no certain 
answers; there is “ocean of uncertainty”. 
Institutional resiliency in transboundary water resources management means that 
institutions and their ecosystems remain resilient to uncertainties and consequently are 
environmentally, politically and economically viable, while the others become vulnerable 
to uncertainties, and thus not effective in the face of change.  
To  find  the  difference  between  resilient  and  vulnerable  water  institution  we  need  a 
theoretical  framework  to  understand  the  subject,  solid  definitions  to  categorize  the 
variables and case studies to see the explanatory scheme in action. 
1.3  Theoretical framework  
There are three main reasons for choosing Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theory as a 
theoretical  framework  for  institutional  assessment  of  transboundary  water  resources 
management models. 
The  first  reason  is  the  complexity  of  relations  in  each  watershed.  Transboundary 
water  management  depends  on  relations  between  riparians  or  stakeholders.  Inter-
                                                 
4 Institutions, Ecosystems and Sustainability. (2001): edited by: Constanza R. et al. CRC Press LLC Lewis publishers.  
5 Ibid.   - 4 -   
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connections between riparians and other relevant agents are not simple or linear and we 
cannot understand the watershed as a sum of its components.
6 
To  understand  the  behavior  of  a  complex  system  we  must  understand  not  only  the 
behavior of the parts but how they act together to form the whole.
7 
States are still the most important pieces on the world chess board. The relevance of 
national governments is declining somewhat, even though the power to take action is still 
concentrated largely at that level.
8 The states themselves are very complex systems and 
their attitude toward transboundary issues is a result of intricate political processes. States 
are not capable of solving transboundary issues without cooperation and therefore they 
may  surrender  part  of  their  sovereignty  in  favor  of  transboundary  water  institutions. 
These institutions may become active agents in the system if they posses an institutional 
body – for example a river basin organization. Institutions without “institutional bodies”, 
like international treaties or mechanisms of international law, do not have an ability to 
express their will, so they cannot become system agents. 
 The Mekong river basin is a good case of complex relations between states, and rivalry 
among  water institutions.
9 The Mekong has six riparians  grouped into  three different 
water institutions or programs including the Mekong River Commission, Greater Mekong 
Sub-region  and  Quadruple  Economic  Cooperation.  MRC  has  four  lower  Mekong 
countries and QEC includes four upper Mekong countries, while Thailand and Laos are 
members of all three organizations at the same time. All six riparians are members of 
GMS. The Mekong River Commission has the longest history of cooperation and has the 
support of various international organizations including UNDP, but has failed to attract 
China and Myanmar as members. The greater Mekong Sub-region program founded by 
ADB, has the advantage of all six riparians being members allowing to it proceed with 
the  implementation  of  large  scale  water  infrastructures  such  as  the  Nam  Theung  2 
hydroelectric  project  in  Lao.  China  is  the  greatest  supporter  of  QEC  and  of  the 
Agreement  on  Commercial  Navigation  on  Lancang-Mekong  River.  This  treaty  was 
signed to improve navigability of the Mekong and to allow Chinese ships to reach sea-
ports in Thailand. Rapids and shoals were blasted to remove obstacles for the large ships. 
This has not been good news for the Mekong River Commision which could have used 
navigability of the Mekong to improve its bargaining position in negotiating Chinese 
participation in its structures.  
Are the relations on Mekong truly complex or just complicated? The answer lies in the 
emergence of the number of rival institutions in the region. Emergent structures may rise 
from the watershed as a result of the patterns of relationships between the agents. Water 
institutions are always a result of interactions between riparian states. System is complex 
in the sense that a great many independent agents are interacting with each other in a 
great many ways.(Waldrop 1993)
10 
 
                                                 
6 Waltz, Kenneth: (1979): Theory of International Politics.  
7 Bar-Yam, Yaneer (1997): Dynamics of Complex Systems. 
8 Murray Gell-Mann (1996): The Simple and the Complex.  
9 Battle for relevance between MRC and GMS in: RATNER, BLAKE D.(2003):"The Politics of Regional Governance in the Mekong 
River Basin", Global Change, Volume 1 
10 Waldrop, M. Mitchell (1993) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos    - 5 -   
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It was not intended or planned to have overlapping institutions on the Mekong. They 
emerged  from  negotiations  between  states  and  they  are  not  an  outcome  of  rational 
planning. If it were otherwise, we would probably not have an incoherent institutional 
framework with several rival institutions. 
The  second  reason  is  the  non-linear  relation  between  causes  and  effects.  Simple 
cause and effect relationships between inputs and outcomes are in fact very rare. A small 
change in a watershed may cause a large effect or no effect at all. Dam construction in 
China  can  influence  biodiversity  in  Tonle-Sap  Lake  and  take  away  the  livelihood  of 
Cambodian fisherman. Water diversion in the Khong Chi Moon project in Thailand can 
result in salinization of the Mekong delta which threatens the rice production in Vietnam. 
The decision to intensify cotton production in USSR caused desiccation of Aral Sea. It is 
interesting, that the magnitude of these effects is extremely difficult to predict. They 
could  be  large,  small  or  have  no  impact  at  all.  This  is  not  something  particular  to 
international watersheds. In history many “inputs” created non-proportional “outputs”: 
the opening of a tunnel started the second intifada, the assassination of the successor to 
the Habsburg Throne started the First World War and many more. 
The third reason is prevailing uncertainty. Institutions are susceptible to an array of 
uncertainties  in  the  environmental,  political,  and  economic  arenas,  threatening  their 
long-term longevity and viability (Fishhanler, Wolf 2005).
11 Geopolitical, socioeconomic 
and  biophysical  uncertainties  are  also  pools  of  perturbations  or  stressors;  they  can 
threaten long term sustainability on one hand, but provide the only proof that institutional 
or ecosystem resilience exists.  
When the uncertainty level is high the academic and policy-making  communities are 
vulnerable  to  searching  for  panaceas.  (Rosenau  J.  1997).
12  Complex  adaptive  system 
theory is focused on complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity itself and does not offer a 
panacea  of  its  own.  CAS  can  only  tell  us  that  complex  systems  are  ultimately 
comprehensible. CAS is a tool to enhance understanding, not a “cure for all” theory. 
Complex  adaptive  system  theory  offers  an  inspiring  conceptual  and  theoretical 
framework  in  which  we  will  examine  various  watersheds  and  their  institutional 
arrangements,  to  identify  resilient  and  vulnerable  models  of  transboundary  water 
management. 
                                                 
11 Fischhendler I., Wolf Aaron T. (2005) Institutional adaptation to uncertainties: a study of transboundary resources. 
12 Rosenau James N.(1996) Many Damn Things Simultaneously:Complexity Theory and World Affair. paper presented at the 
Conference on Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. 
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1.4  Definitions 
Description  of  the  institutional  resilience  would  not  be  possible  without  clear 
definitions.(Box 1) 
BOX 1 
Transboundary Water Institutions are persistent and predictable arrangements like treaties, laws, or 
organizational structures dealing with transboundary water resources.  
The  system  of  all  institutions  connected  to  transboundary  water  issues  in  the  basin  constitutes  an 
institutional framework. 
Resilience is the ability to return to the steady state following a perturbation. (Pimm, 1984; O’Neill et al., 
1986; Tilman and Downing, 1994; Tilman, 1996)
13 
1) A transboundary water institution is in steady state, when it performs according to a given set of 
rules.  Every  international  water  institution  has  a  set  of  rules,  which  governs  its  institutional  life  and 
defines goals for transboundary water management. For example, if the main purpose of the Indus Waters 
Treaty (India and Pakistan, 1960) is water allocation, the steady state would be the situation, when all 
waters from the Indus would be allocated according to the treaty provisions. 
2) Steady state for institutional framework is a state of sustainable water management.  
A  sustainable  system  is  a  renewable  system  that  survives  for  some  specified  (non-infinite)  time. 
(Contanza and Patten 1995)  
Perturbation  is  an  external  stimulus,  which  has  impact  on  the  water  institution.  In  this  paper 
perturbations are called stressors, in compliance with proposed terminology of long term research project 
in this field.
14 In case of the Indus waters treaty 1960 the stressor would be two Indo-Pakistani wars in 
1965 and 1971. 
Emergence is the production of global patterns of behaviour by agents in a complex system interacting 
according to their own local rules of behaviour, without intending the global patterns of behaviour that 
come about. In emergence, global patterns cannot be predicted from the local rules of behaviour that 
produce them. To put it another way, global patterns cannot be reduced to individual behaviour. (Stacey 
1996)
15 
Embedded systems are components 
 
2  Stressors and transboundary water institutions 
Water  institutions  are  embedded  systems  in  a  complex  and  rapidly  changing  world. 
Uncertainties  are  continually  threatening  the  sustainability  of  transboundary  water 
institutions and institutional frameworks. Stresses or perturbations can significantly vary 
in length and intensity. They do not have to indicate abrupt changes in future conditions. 
For example, water dependency and significant power asymmetry appeared a relatively 
long time before the development of a system of international relations. Perturbations or 
stresses are not only obscured by future uncertainties, they are also the heritage of our 
                                                 
13 Gunderson, Lance; Holling, C. S.; Pritchard, L. Peterson G. D.: Resilience. Volume 2, The Earth system: biological and ecological 
dimensions of global environmental change, pp 530–531 in: Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change 2002 
14 Fischhendler I., Wolf Aaron T. (2005) Institutional adaptation to uncertainties: a study of transboundary resources. 
15 Stacey, Ralph (1996): “Complexity and Creativity in Organizations”   - 7 -   
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turbulent past. Institutional resilience is needed to face biophysical, socioeconomic and 
geopolitical stresses.  
According  to  post-Rio
16  sustainability  discourse,  stresses  can  be  divided  into  three 
categories. Geopolitical, socioeconomic and biophysical stressors will be identified in 
international watersheds.  
2.1  Geopolitical stressors 
Geopolitical stressors can be seen as a result of longstanding interaction between space 
and politics. Watersheds as hydrological units are divided among states as political units 
in a process of fragmentation which creates transboundary watersheds.
17 Building viable 
joint  water  institutions  is  a  contrasting  process,  which  creates  linkages  or  joint 
mechanisms to share transboundary resources. The system of international relations is the 
most important source of geopolitical stressors. The concrete stressors might include, but 
cannot  be  restricted  to:  significant  power  asymmetry,  absence  of  diplomatic  relation 
between  riparian  countries,  significant  dependence  on  transboundary  water  resource, 
generally  hostile  relations,  no  incentives  for  cooperation,  ideological  conflicts, 
internationalization of river basin, international integration that goes across the basins, 
disintegration of riparian states, major political shift including change of government, 
under representation in RBO, public participations of NGO groups and dissent within the 
states, change of riverbed border, unresolved territory claims, etc. 
2.2  Socio-economical stressors 
Watershed  dynamics  in  demography,  industrial  development  and  local  or  global 
economic changes are among the foremost sources of socioeconomic stress. Some of 
them are more predictable than others. It is highly probable that post-Taliban Afghanistan 
will go through a phase of economic development and thus water withdrawals from Syr-
Darya  tributaries  will  increase.  A  similar  situation  also  applies  to  Cambodia  on  the 
Mekong. Stressors from changes in the global economy are much harder to forecast and 
could  have  devastating  impacts:  Argentina’s  performance  in  the  Paraná-La  Plata 
institutional framework after its economic collapse should be researched. Privatization 
and the introduction of market mechanisms in the post-communist countries might have 
an  impact  on  the  on  joint  water  management  structures  as  they  take  control  of  the 
agricultural sector from state. Other examples of socioeconomic stressors could be: rapid 
change in population growth rate (increase/decrease), unreliable and unavailable water 
basin  data,  deterioration  of  an  economic  situation  and  market  changes,  privatization, 
changes  in  development  capital  policy,  changes  in  water  consumption  following 
industrial  development,  expansion  of  irrigated  land  area,  neglected  water  needs  of 
riparians in periods of instability, increased hydropower demands, etc. 
2.3  Biophysical stressor 
Biophysical stressors have a direct impact on river basin ecosystems, and an indirect 
impact on water institutions. Resilience is needed in both cases, but ecosystem resilience 
is different than institutional resilience. Ecosystems have developed through a process of 
evolution and can flip to another regime of behavior. Ecosystem resilience is measured 
                                                 
16 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 
17 Parker, Geoffrey: (1999) "Globalisation and the Status of the Territorial State." Paper presented at the International Roundtable on 
the Challenges of Globalization   - 8 -   
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by the magnitude of perturbation that can be absorbed before the system redefines its 
structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior
18 
Institutions have been created through the process of political negotiation and use treaties 
consisting of rules to govern their institutional life. They are designed to have only one 
steady state or equilibrium.  
A  water  institution  is  in  a  steady  state  when  the  riparian  and  stakeholders  in  the 
watershed are sharing water according to the rules incorporated within the institutional 
arrangement. In short if the institutional genotype is in compliance with the institutional 
phenotype.  
Transboundary  water  institutions  are  not  very  likely  to  change  state  to  another 
equilibrium  system.  Ecosystems  are  mostly  multiple-equilibrium  systems  and  many 
different steady states can develop over time. 
Someone might argue that even a single institution can reorganize and find a different 
equilibrium; take the Interim Mekong Committee (1979-1995) as an example. After the 
Vietnamese invasion and installation of a pro-Vietnamese government in Cambodia, the 
Cambodian government was no longer independent and the Mekong Committee could no 
longer  accept  Cambodian  representation.  An  interim  Mekong  Committee  (IMC)  was 
established in 1979. IMC was nothing like its predecessor, it had only three members and 
projects  on  the  main  stream  were  paralyzed.
19  After  long  and  difficult  negotiations, 
Cambodia was readmitted in 1995. (Box 5)  
Single  institutions  are mostly  single  equilibrium  systems,  but  basin  wide  institutional 
frameworks  can  probably  reorganize  and  find  a  new  equilibrium  through  emergent 
behavior.  
The fact that biophysical stressors affect both ecosystem and institutional resilience make 
them more intricate than other stressors. Their effect on institutions may be delayed as it 
needs to overcome ecosystem resilience first. The Aral Sea is a good example of the 
delayed effect of biophysical stress, as its institutional framework seems to be resilient to 
geopolitical  changes,  but  the  process  of  environmental  degradation  is  most  likely 
irreversible and harm to the ecosystem permanent.  
The river basin population depends on the ecosystems, and the institutional framework is 
responsible for the population and the ecosystem. In other words, perfect international 
cooperation over transboundary water, that fails to protect ecosystem or population is not 
resilient. 
The  list  of  biophysical  stressors  may  include:  drought,  flood,  erosion,  change  of 
ecosystem,  sedimentation,  unstable  amplitude  of  seasonal  flow,  biophysical  changes 
resulting  in  decease  of  water  in  watershed,  unsustainable  withdrawal  in  aquifers  , 
salinization caused by improper water management, and deterioration of water quality 
due to industry/sanitation/fertilizing. 
                                                 
18 Gunderson, Lance; Holling, C. S.; Pritchard, L. Peterson G. D.: Resilience. Volume 2, The Earth system: biological and ecological 
dimensions of global environmental change, pp 530–531 in: Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change 2002 
19 Nakayama, Mikiyasu (2004): China as Basin Country of International Rivers   - 9 -   
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2.4  How to measure institutional resilience  
Resilience  occurs  only  if  the  institutional  framework  is  impacted  by  a  geopolitical, 
socioeconomic or biophysical stressor. The higher the level of present stress, the more 
institutional  resiliency  is  needed  to  return  to  the  steady  state.  Considering  the 
mathematical limits of this hypothesis and the possible metrics for measuring institutional 
resilience, we can gauge institutional resilience as inversely proportional to stress.(Figure 
1) This means that the number of resilient water institutions will decrease with the growth 
of stressor intensity. 
 
 
Despite  the  simplicity  and  linearity  of  the  proposed  measuring  method,  there  is  one 
important  implication.  No  institution  could  be  resilient  at  the  maximal  intensity  of  a 
stressor and reorganization of the institutional framework would become inevitable. The 
search for an ideal institution is the search for a panacea that can not be found. The study 
of institutions and stressors in the context of CAS can help improve components of the 
institutional framework, as well as gain more resilience and facilitate reorganization on 
institutional framework level where emergent behavior and self-organization are possible 
through interaction between independent agents – states and other relevant international 
actors. 
2.5  Insufficient resilience, adaptation and role of institutional framework 
What happens if the stressors are too intense or last for a long period of time and there is 
not enough resilience to return to a steady state? It depends on whether we are talking 
about water institution, or about the whole framework. Possible scenarios for a single 
institution are: incompliance with the institutional mechanism by agents, termination of 
an institution, or change of rules and institutional reform. 
The institutional framework as a system of all institutions in one watershed offers a more 
interesting perspective. If the institutional framework is not resilient enough to return to 
the steady state after a geopolitical, socioeconomic or biophysical perturbation, various 
negative  events  may  occur.  Geopolitical  stressors  may  induce  water  conflicts,  and   - 10 -   
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socioeconomic and biophysical stressors can result in ecosystem degradation, acute water 
scarcity,  poverty  and  other  negative  impacts  of  insufficient  or  unsustainable  water 
management.  
Fortunately the institutional framework as system is more resilient, because it has more 
properties of a complex adaptive system and emergent behavior and self-organization do 
play an important role on this level.  
In the case studies we will attempt to reveal the most important stresses threatening the 
institutional  and  ecosystem  resilience  as  well  as  roughly  estimate  their  impact  in  the 
examined basins. 
3  Aral Sea Basin 
The  disappearing  Aral  Sea,  once  the  4
th  largest  body  of  water  in  the  world,  is  fed 
primarily by two rivers: the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The Aral Sea basin is shared 
by the five post-Soviet countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and three other countries: China, Afghanistan and Iran. 
3.1  Biophysical stressors 
This transboundary basin is very often taken as an example of environmental degradation 
and  it  is  abundant  with  examples  of  biophysical  stressors.  Decrease  of  flow  and 
subsequent soil degradation due to the Soviet-era irrigation schemes for immense cotton 




22 pollution is disturbing the fragile ecosystem resilience of the 
region. Uncertainties of climate change led to the world’s most persistent and severe 
drought in Central and Southeast Asia. The drought has had devastating socioeconomic 
and environmental consequences and has been exacerbated by the rapid disappearance of 
glaciers in the Pamir Mountains. Glaciers feeding the flow of the Amu-Darya have been 
reduced by 40 % in recent decades.
23 Climatologists predict that rapid melting of the 
Pamir’s  glaciers  will  increase  flow  of  the  Amu-Darya  in  winter  and  reduce  flow  in 
summer. Such flow reallocation will have a severe impact on the availability of water for 
irigation.
24 It is not an overstatement to say that the whole region is an environmental 
disaster.
25 
3.2  Geopolitical stressors 
The largest geopolitical change in the recent history of the Central Asia region was the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, which it created a huge stress on the institutional 
framework of the Aral Sea basin. In the Soviet Union every important decision had been 
made  by  the  water  ministry  -  Minvodkhoz.  This  method  of  authoritative  resources 
management  is  primarily  responsible  for  the  present  biophysical  and  socioeconomic 
stressors. Central Asia has always been located between world powers which has resulted 
                                                 
20 Dukhovny, V and Sokolov, V (2005) “Challenges and Actions for integrated Approaches: position for the 4 World Water Forum 
Central Asia” Scientific-Information Center ICWC 
21 Carius, Alexander and Feil, Moira (2003): "The case of Central Asia and South Easatern Europe: Environment and Security 
Transforming risks into cooperation" UNEP (ROE), UNDP and OSCE  
22 Brashko, Vasilina (2002): "Anthrax on Vozrozhdenie Island", Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia (ICWC) 
bulletin No 1 (29) 
23 Dukhovnyi, Viktor and Shuter U., (2003): “ Southern PriAralie-new prospects, Science for Peace” Tashkent 
24. Dukhovny, Viktor A (2002): “Dialogue on Water and Cimate" Aral Sea Basin Case Study 
25 Sievers, Eric W. (2002): “Water, Conflict, and Regional Secourity in Central Asia.” N.Y.U Evirnonmental Law Journal.   - 11 -   
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in political fragmentation and ethnic diversity. Central Asia is not clearly dominated by 
any  of  the  world  power.  Russia,  Turkey,  Iran,  China,  Pakistan,  India  and  the  United 
States all have strategic interests in this region. Central Asia may become geopolitically 
unstable, which might deteriorate the relations between riparians and disrupt the water 
cooperation framework. 
3.3  Socioeconomic stressors 
An important, but sometimes overlooked stress factor is the delayed development of post-
Taliban Afghanistan, which stood apart from the building of joint water institutions in the 
1990s.  Future Afghan water needs were not accounted for by existing institutions and a 
substantial increase in water usage is expected due too increased economic development.  
3.4  Complex concurrent stressors with a feedback loop 
Socioeconomic and biophysical stressors in the Aral Sea basin are intertwined and create an 
amplifying feedback loop. It is impossible to deal with them without a coordinated approach. 
Significant  (though  varying  in  extent)  decreases  in  GDP  per  capita  in  all  riparian 
countries have led to a sharp reduction in subsidies and support of agriculture and the 
water  sector.
26  Estimated  costs  of  nation-wide  installation  of  a  highly  effective  drip 
irrigation system in Uzbekistan are USD $100 billion.
27 Uzbekistan is the second largest 
cotton exporter and its agricultural sector creates 38% of the nation’s GDP. A significant 
factor affecting the regional water sector is the sharp fall of world prices for cotton (from 
$1,760 to $800 per tone). The introduction of market mechanisms in agriculture, and 
privatization have caused the break up of large state and collective farms into hundreds 
and thousands of small farms. This change was not combined with the establishment of 
effective infrastructures and institutions for water distribution and allocation.
28 
BOX 2   
Toktogul dispute 
The impact of concurrent stressors on the politics of riparian countries in an internationalized river basin 
can  be  illustrated  by  a  dispute  between  Kyrgyzstan  and  downstream  riparian  countries.  Toktogul  dam 
reservoir and its 1200 MW hydropower plant were built in the former the Soviet Republic. Kyrgyz SSR 
was entitled to a free supply of fossil fuels principally from Uzbekistan, in exchange for timely water 
releases according to the agricultural needs of its downstream neighbors. This barter trade however ended 
with the break up of the USSR. Uzbekistan began asking for market prices for its fossil fuels and demanded 
that the water releases remain at the same rate in summer for the sake of its cotton fields. Kyrgyzstan was 
releasing water in winter to produce electricity for heating and reciprocally asked downstream states to 
contribute to the operation and maintenance of the Toktogul water infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan estimated 
costs as high as USD 25 million a year.(Siviers 2002, McCaffrey 2003) It may seem from the first glimpse 
of this situation that the dispute is caused by geopolitical stress (disintegration of the USSR), but this stress 
occurred after the introduction of a free market to the region. 
  
                                                 
26 Dukhovny, Viktor and Sokolov, Vadim (2003): "Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea 
Basin" PCCP series n°11 
27 Sievers, Eric W. (2002): “Water, Conflict, and Regional Secourity in Central Asia.” N.Y.U Evirnonmental Law Journal. 
28 Dukhovny, Viktor and Sokolov, Vadim (2003): "Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea 
Basin" PCCP series n°11   - 12 -   
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3.5  Resilience of institutional framework and its ecosystem 
The institutional framework of the Aral can be divided into two groups. The first group 
subsumes  soft  law  basin-wide  water  institutions  incorporated  into  a  multilateral 
declaration and joint institutions as the 1992 Agreement on Cooperation and Interstate 
Commission  on  Water  Coordination  (ICWC  1993),  which  was  later  integrated  with 
International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS 1997). This soft law institutional arrangement 
has two purposes:  
1)  Coordinate the state’s water policies 
2)  Create a platform for distribution of funds contributed by international donors 
(World Bank, GEF, European Union, UNDP, UNESCO, USAID, SIDA etc.) 
The first group of institutions may be resilient to potential geopolitical stress to a certain 
degree  as  its  primary  purpose  is  likely  fundraising  from  the  international  donor 
community. This matter will need a further detailed survey.  
The second group consists of more specific “hard law” instruments like the 1997 Treaty 
on Use of the Syr Darya Water Resources and the 1996 Treaty on the Use of Water and 
Energy Resources of the Syr Darya River basin. These treaties were aimed at finding the 
solution to the water issue and energy sharing in the Syr Darya River basin. (BOX 2) 
Nevertheless, like in previous cases, the two treaties failed by and large because of the 
non-compliance problem.
29 
 Despite the fact the Aral Sea basin is a very volatile region; its framework does not seem 
to be significantly affected by geopolitical stress - however that does not mean that it is 
resilient to it either. Review of riparian countries attitudes on transboundary water issues 
can  be  assessed  from  their  adherence  to  international  law.  They  accede  to  various 
conventions on environmental protection
30 just for the sake of acceding, avoiding the 
implications of such treaties. Reform of state policies and adoption of sustainable water 
use patterns will be necessary to confront the enormous biophysical stressors in Central 
Asia. 
                                                 
29 Shalpykova, Gulnara (2002) Water Disputes in Central Asia: The Syr Darya River Basin 
30 Sievers, Eric W. (2002): “Water, Conflict, and Regional Secourity in Central Asia.” N.Y.U Evirnonmental Law Journal 
BOX 3  
Development of the Aral basin Institutional framework:  
The need to integrate water resources management was recognized before the internalization of the Aral 
Sea Basin. In the climate of the Perestroika proposal for an institutional framework, approved in 1986, two 
River Basin Organizations were created: RBO “Amu-Darya” with headquarter in Urgench, and BWO 
“Syr-Darya”  in  Tashkent.
31  In  the  period  of  independence,  the  Interstate  Commission  for  Water 
Coordination (ICWC) was founded in accordance with the “Agreement on collaboration in the sphere of 
joint water resources management within interstate water sources” approved in 1993. Later (in 1993), two 
new organizations were established. Those were: the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS), set up for 
program coordination; and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), which had the purpose 
of raising and controlling funds. Later these two bodies were merged into the new IFAS. This institutional 
framework  comprises  post-soviet  republics.  Other  riparian  states  such  as  China  are  connected  to  the 
framework via a bilateral treaty.   - 13 -   
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4  Ganges-Brahmaputra-Mengha 
4.1  Geopolitical stress 
The Ganges River is a part of larger Ganges-Brahmaputra-Mengha watershed shared by 
five riparian countries: Nepal, Bhutan, China, India and Bangladesh.
32  
Among the main geopolitical stressors are: significant power asymmetry, complete water 
dependence, and undisputed territory claims. Without active China’s involvement, India 
is by far the strongest riparian country in the basin. Significant power asymmetry between 
India and its upstream neighbors (Nepal, Bhutan) and downstream neighbor (Bangladesh) 
might be the reason for the strictly bilateral institutional framework.
33  
Bilateral links between India and its neighbors sustain stressors like unresolved territory 
claims, sudden political shifts or political assassinations of Prime Ministers of India and 
Bangladesh.
34 
In  addition  to  the  most  apparent  geopolitical  stressors  presented  above,  more  subtle 
stressors are present in the Ganghes-Brahmaputra-Meghna watershed. For example Indo-
Nepal water relations have always been worse than relations between India and Bhutan. 
Explanation of the difference might be in different perceptions of national identity by 
Bhutan and Nepal. 
The Kingdom of Nepal is economically and politically dependent on India and shares the 
same  Hindu  culture.  Predominantly  Nepalese  leaders  use  nationalism  and  anti-Indian 
feelings  to  justify  the  existence  of  their  monarchy.  India  was  also  involved  in  both 
Nepalese revolutions in 1951 and 1990 and the process of democratization in the 90s was 
supported  by  India.  The  question  of  Indo-Nepalese  relations  became  a  controversial 
theme on the political scene in Nepal once it was established in 1990s. 
In contrast, isolated Bhutan is a Buddhist kingdom, and is very different from India in 
terms of religion and ethnicity. Bhutan does not see an urgent need to its national identity 
against their powerful neighbor. India is planning and financing water infrastructure in 
Bhutan and buys the electricity at advantageous rate. 
This is a good example how complexities of national politics can influence relatively 
simple bilateral water institutions. Embedded institutional systems like states can be even 
more  complex,  then  the  system  of  relations  on  the  international  level.  The  effect 
perturbations within the state on the institutional framework were significant and in the 
years to come quickly Bhutan will over take Nepal’s hydroelectric capacity.
35  
4.2  Socio-economical stressors 
Rapid  population  growth  and  expansion  of  irrigated  areas,  data  sharing  problems, 
pollution combined with increased water demand and hydroelectricity demand in India 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Dukhovny, Viktor and Sokolov, Vadim (2003): "Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea 
Basin" PCCP series n°11 
32 TFDD: The sixth is Myanmar, which is sharing only negligible 80 km2 of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Mengha basin. 
33 Aline Baillat: Hydropolitics in Small Mountainous States. Two Cases of Cross-Asymmetries: The Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
Republic of South Africa, the Kingdom of Nepal and the Republic of India, 2004 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 
34 Swain Ashok: (2004) “Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East” Routledge London and New York  
35 Aline Baillat: Hydropolitics in Small Mountainous States. Two Cases of Cross-Asymmetries: The Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
Republic of South Africa, the Kingdom of Nepal and the Republic of India, 2004 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva   - 14 -   
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are the most obvious socio-economical stressors in the basin. An interesting modality of 
data-sharing  problems  tested  resilience  of  the  1996  Treaty  between  India  and 
Bangladesh.
36 Political representatives of the countries used inflated water flow data to 
create an unrealistic water budget for the allocation in the treaty. The reason behind the 
data manipulation was to please the constituency and blanket opposition.
37 
4.3  Biophysical stress 
There  is  a  great  seasonal  variability  in  the  total  amount  of  rainfall  and  its  spatial 
distribution within the basin: three quarters of the yearly precipitation occurs only during 
the three monsoon months, June, July and August. As a consequence, the basin suffers 
from  severe  droughts  in  the  dry  months  and  floods  inundate  large  areas  during  the 
monsoon  season.
38Bangladesh  experiences  yearly  flooding  on  up  to  two-thirds  of  its 
territory during the monsoon season.
39 
4.4  Institutional framework 
The  main  pillars  of  the  contemporary  institutional  framework  are  on  three  bilateral 
transboundary water cooperation sets of institutions. The dyads are not interconnected 
and can be examined discretely. Institutional framework could be likened to wheel and 
then India would be a hub and bilateral links would be a spokes. The “Dharma Chakra” 
wheel is also incidentally on the Indian flag. 
Institutions working between Bhutan and India is seems to be very resilient. There are 
no major biophysical stressors and cooperation is profitable for both sides. Bhutan does 
not  have  capacity  and  financial  resources  to  build  water  infrastructure  to  utilize  its 
immense hydroelectric potential and India is the only reasonable buyer for the produced 
electricity. There are no identity problems and a special treaty relationship with India is 
helps to protecting Bhutan against Chinese agression. Memorandum of understanding 
was signed in September 2003 with regards the 870 MW Punatsangchu hydroelectric 
power project.
40 
Relations between India and Nepal improved as evidenced by the Mahakali Agreement 
signed in 1996. Mahakali River forms the boundary between the India and Nepal; the 
treaty gives the right to both countries to the equal entitlement of the utilization of the 
waters and specifies implementation of the joint Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project. This 
relationship is different then the case of Bhutan. Nepal is trying to be as independent as 
possible and seeks investors for Hydroelectric project between international donors or 
private companies. For example Kali - Gandak power plant inaugurated in January 2004 
is  the  largest  hydroelectricity  project  in  Nepal,  and  it  was  financed  by  the  Nepalese 
government and Nepal Electric Authority with loans of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).
41 
                                                 
36 Treaty Between the government of the Republic of India and the government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of 
the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka 
37 McCaffrey, S.C. (2002): Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for resolving them. in: Resolution of International 
Water Disputes. Kluwer Law International November 2002    
38 Elhance, Arun (2000): „Hydropolitics in the Third World“ 
39 Herb Wiebe (2000)"Flood Action Plan in Bangladesh" 
40 Aline Baillat: Hydropolitics in Small Mountainous States. Two Cases of Cross-Asymmetries: The Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
Republic of South Africa, the Kingdom of Nepal and the Republic of India, 2004 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 
41 Ibid.   - 15 -   
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The dispute over the Farakka barrage (see Box 4) had been deteriorating the relations 
between India and Bangladesh for many years before agreement was signed in the year 
1996.
42 This agreement valid for 30 years has been concluded after more then 20 years of 
negotiations resulting provisional solutions because of seasonal fluctuation of water flow 
and climatic uncertainty. Both sides agreed to use overestimated water budget for the 
unrealistic 1996 Treaty allocation mechanism to make the treaty politically feasible. This 
did not pay of as the severe drought impacted Bangladesh and mass protest were pressing 
Bangladeshi government to find a solution. Bangladesh requested immediate consultation 
with India on emergency basis as permitted by Article 2 of the 1996 Treaty, but then 
unexpected rain eased the tensions.
43  
Perturbation may vary in length and in this case, the whole framework would probably 
not  have  been  able  to  return  to  steady  state  if  the  drought  had  lasted  much  longer. 
Therefore 1996 Treaty could be vulnerable to drought in the future.  
The change from bilateral institutions to multilateral institutions is widely discussed in 
scientific community, because it broadens the “basket of benefits” and creates a better 
platform  for  determination  of  win-win  scenario  (Wolf  2002,  Rahaman  2003).
44  A 
multilateral framework will most certainly bring more possibilities for cooperation, but is 
not necessary a step towards resilience to geopolitical stressors for two reasons: firstly, 
bilateral institutions developed through time according to the power configuration in the 
basin;  secondly,  if  one  of  the  bilateral  links  breaks  up,  the  other  connections  remain 
intact.  
In  this  case  the  system  works  differently  than  in  the  Mekong,  where  unilateral 
development in China can disrupt the existing cooperation of lower Mekong countries 
with  increased  uncertainty  of  available  water  quantity  and  possible  modification 
downstream ecosystems.   
Box 4 
Diversion at Farakka: 
The Farakka barrage water diversion was disturbed the relationship between India and Bangladesh for more 
then 20 years. India began operation of Ganges water diversion project in West Bengal in the year 1975 to 
improve navigation in the port of Culcatta and Hooghly channel by reducing sludge sedimentation and 
salinity. This diversion threatened historic uses of Bangladesh. Eighty percent of Bangladeshi’s annual 
water budget depends on water flowing from India (Nishat, Faisal, 2000). In 1975-76 several geopolitical 
and biophysical stressors including drought, a military coup and the assassination of the Bangladeshi Prime 
Minister  Mujibur  Rahman,  destroyed  the  positive  momentum  in  mutual  relations.  Bangladesh  tried  to 
improve its weak bargaining position through official protests in the UN General Assembly, Summit of 
Non-aligned Movement and the Islamic foreign ministers conference (Swain 2004). After an unsuccessful 
pursuit of change from bilateral to multilateral negotiations, Bangladesh returned to bilateral talks with 
India  and  finally  signed  a  water  treaty  in  1977.  Unfortunately  this  treaty  failed  to  address  the  key 
biophysical stressor – seasonal fluctuation of flow. It was not planned as a long term solution. It failed to 
guarantee minimal flow to Bangladesh in the time of drought and had to be renewed every 5 years. 
Long term (30 year) institutional arrangement was signed in 1996 
45 but the ability of the institution to 
perform under biophysical stress of seasonal fluctuation of flow is still questionable. 
                                                 
42 Treaty Between the government of the Republic of India and the government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of 
the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka. 
43 McCaffrey, S.C. (2002): Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for resolving them. in: Resolution of International 
Water Disputes. Kluwer Law International November 2002 
44 Rahaman Muhammad M.:(2003) "Water versus power: Role of dams in geopolitics of Ganges basin." Riversymposium 2003 
Papers. 
45 1996 treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka   - 16 -   
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5  MEKONG 
The Mekong River  flows from Qing Hai province in western China and through the 
provinces of Xizang (Tibet) and Yunnan. In southern Yunnan, it leaves China to form the 
border of Myanmar and Lao PDR, crosses the territories of Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam  and  finally  discharges  into  South  China  Sea.  Development  of  the  water 
institutions on the Mekong River can be divided into three distinct periods. (see Box 5) 
5.1  Biophysical stressors 
The Thai Khong Chi Mun
46 diversion plan and similar activities held the potential for 
worsening  environmental  problems  already  present  in  the  highly  productive  Mekong 
delta. Around 25% of the Mekong’s flow feeds Vietnam’s Mekong delta and 1.6 million 
ha of the delta suffers from salt-water intrusion from the South China Sea.
47 Geologic 
surveys have confirmed the presence of large areas of underground salt deposits in many 
provinces  in  the  northeastern  region.
48  Two  million  hectares  in  the  Korat  plateau  are 
influenced by underlying geologic salt deposits.
49 Additional stressors include: seasonal 
fluctuation  of  flow  and  floods;  change  of  ecosystems  impacting  local  populations 
(fishermen on Tonle Sap in Cambodia), etc. 
5.2  Geopolitical Stressors 
Among the main geopolitical stressors in the Mekong basin we find significant power 
asymmetry between states on different levels; lack of interest on the Chinese side in 
entering a broader cooperation framework; ideological conflict between communist and 
non-communist  countries  have  played  a  significant  role  in  the  past;  Thailand  and 
Cambodia dispute sections of their boundaries because of missing boundary markers; 
Cambodia claims Thai encroachments into Cambodian territory and obstructing access to 
Preah  Vihear  temple  ruins
50;  environmentalists  in  Myanmar  and  Thailand  remain 
concerned about China' s construction of hydroelectric dams upstream on the Salween 
River in Yunnan Province.  
5.3  Socio-economical Stressors 
Uneven  economic  development  created  a  gap  between  Thailand  and  post  communist 
lower Mekong Riparian countries. Thailand was able to find financing for the Kong Chi 
Moon Project from regional sources through  ADB and  consequently lost some of its 
incentives for cooperation with other lower Mekong counties.
51 
                                                 
46 Lerdsak Kamkongsak and Margie Law: Laying waste to the land: Thailand’s Khong-Chi-Mun Irrigation Project; Watershed Vol. 6 
No. 3, 2001 
47 (Hiebert, 1991a, 28; 1991b,24) HIEBERT, M. 1991a “Muddy Waters.” Far Eastern Economic Review (21 February): 28, 1991b . 
“The Common Stream” Far Eastern Economic Review (21 February): 24. 
48 Fedra, K., Winkelbauer, L. and Pantulu. V.R. (1991): RR-91-19. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. A-236l 
Laxenburg, Austria 
49 HIEBERT, M. (1991): “Muddy Waters”; “ The Common Stream” Far Eastern Economic Review 
50 CIA World Factbook 
51 Joint Declaration of Principles (1975) articles 10 and 20    - 17 -   
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5.4  Institutional framework 
The institutional framework on the Mekong was formed through the second half of the 
20
th century and has gone through many changes. The last reorganization was started by 
the ending of the cold war. 
Box 5 
From Mekong Committee to Mekong River Commision 
The first period of the Mekong Committee (1950s – 1975) was characterized by significant US economic, and 
later military, presence in the region. The second period (1975 – 1995) was started by the spread of communist 
regimes in the region leading into a stall of the Interim Mekong Committee. Cambodia was not considered a fully 
independent country after the Vietnamese invasion in 1978 and thus the IMC had only three members. The 
institution withstood the geopolitical stress, but no major mainstream project was feasible in the times of IMC. 
Cooperation with Cambodia was possible again after of the Paris peace accord in 1991. Despite of favorable 
conditions on both the regional and the international levels the negotiation process was far from simple. Thailand 
continued with the implementation of Khong-Chi-Mun project, in order to direct water from the mainstream of 
the Mekong River into its underdeveloped Northeastern region.
52 Thus Thailand was reluctant to return to the 
1975 Joint Declaration,
53 as its Article 20 demands “unanimous consent” of all members – practically a veto 
power – for any mainstream extra-basin diversion. Thailand did not want to submit its unilateral project for 
revision. The MRC Executive Agent, Chuck Lancaster, was advocating submission of the Khong Chi Moon 
irrigation scheme and Thailand declared him persona non grata.
54 UNDP career employee was recalled back to 
UNDP headquarters and the existence of the long standing cooperation on Lower Mekong was at risk. The 
Deputy Foreign Minister of Thailand said: if joining the committee means the loss of our sovereignty, we prefer 
to  go  it  alone.
55  UNDP  mobilized  its  powers  to  bring  the  countries  to  negotiations.  Some  cooperation 
mechanisms  had  to  be  removed  to  reach  a  compromise.  “Veto  power”  was  neutralized  by  Thailand’s  non-
compromising stance and the former position of Executive Agent was redefined as a position called CEO albeit 
with fewer powers. Finally Cambodia was readmitted to the Mekong River commission and the Agreement on 
cooperation was signed in 1995.
56 
 
The period from 1995 onward is characterized by a plurality of overlapping institutions, 
the increasing role of China in regional politics and rapid economic development and 
implementation of water development plans. Beside the most prominent Mekong River 
Commission that has existed through the whole second half of 20
th century and is an 
outstanding  example  of  institutional  resilience,  there  are  at  lest  two  other  regional 
institutions that are gaining momentum. 
The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) program of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
began  operation  in  1992.  GMS  has  the  clear  advantage  of  having  all  six  Mekong 
countries  as  members  and  recently  moved  to  implementation  of  water  infrastructure 
projects like the 1,070 megawatt Nam Theung 2 dam in Laos. 
The Quadripartite Economic Cooperation (QEC) is an initiative of China, Thailand, Laos 
and Myanmar. QEC is proceeding with the blasting of rapids on the Mekong, to improve 
                                                 
52NAKAYAMA,  Mikiyasu:  TRANSITION  FROM  MEKONG  COMMITTEE  TO  MEKONG  RIVER 
COMMISSION.http://www.wrrc.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~aphw/APHW2004/proceedings/APHW-Others/56-OTH-A695/56-OTH-
A695.pdf 
53 Joint Declaration of Principles (1975) Article 20 
54 Makim, Abigail(2002): The Changing Face of Mekong Resource Politics in the Post-Cold War Era: re-negotiating arrangements 
for water resource management in the Lower Mekong River Basin (1991-1995) 
55 Kanwerayotin, S. (1992): The Mekong - More of a liability than an asset?, Bangkok Post, 21 March 1992  
56 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 1995  
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the Mekong’s navigability. This will allow 100 ton ships to navigate from Thai sea-ports 
to the Chinese province of Yunnan.
57 China is main the benefactor of this agreement, but 
blasting of the rapids may have a negative environmental impact on both Vietnam and 
Cambodia. 
Establishment of the QEC and especially the signing of the Lancang-Mekong Navigation 
Agreement has been a wasted opportunity for the MRC to attract China, which is still 
very reluctant to enter to MRC. Navigation could have been a part of larger “basket of 
benefits”,  that  would  have  brought  China  into  a  basin  wide  cooperative  framework. 
Yunnan province of PR China does not benefit from foreign investments like coastal 
provinces, but if Yunnan goods could reach Thai ports, it would be a large boost for 
Yunnan’s economy. 
China’s ambition is to get access to the sea for goods from Yunnan and continue with 
unrestricted dam construction on the Upper Mekong. QEC is a good platform to achieve 
this goals and the Commercial Navigation agreement (2002 – China, Myanmar, Laos, 
Thailand) is very profitable for China.  
The absence of China renders the Mekong River Commission vulnerable to biophysical 
and socioeconomic stress as it cannot estimate the amount and quality of water in the 
Mekong  due  to  the  development  of  Chinese  hydroelectric  and  water  infrastructure 
projects in Yunnan. China plans to build seven cascade hydropower dams in the Upper 
Mekong Basin. Manwan dam, was officially completed in 1996, but its reservoir was 
filled earlier in the 1992-1993 dry season.
58 Construction of the second dam Dachaoshan 
dam was completed in December 2002.
59Construction on the third dam, Xiaowan Dam, 
began  in  2001  and  is  expected  to  complete  by  2013.
60  Hydropower  development  in 
Yunnan Province in the PRC is likely to have a great impact on hydrology of the Mekong 




Laos also has plans for development in the hydropower sector, that are likely to have 
significant downstream impacts. However Laos will have to consult with the MRC on its 
schemes for development. Consultation with downstream riparian nations can improve 
the systems resilience against biophysical and socioeconomic stress and keep the Mekong 
development sustainable. It is absolutely vital to bring China into the broader institutional 
framework;  It  could  be  done  in  various  ways.  Cooperation  between  Mekong  River 
Commission and Greater Mekong Sub-region seems to be very promising and seems 
promising and is likely an effective way to improve the resilience of Mekong institutional 
framework. 
                                                 
57 Free navigation is stipulated in (2000) Lancang-Mekong Navigation Agreement 
58 International Rivers Network. October 2002. “China’s Upper Mekong Dams Endanger illions Downstream.” Briefing Paper 3. 
Berkeley, California 
59 Khanh , Tran Tien (2003): „ Death of A River :The Mekong River and the Chinese Development Projects UpstreamVietnamese“ 
Bulletin Vietnamien, Vol. 19, No.1 
60 Richardson, Michael. 2002. “Sharing the Mekong: an Asian challenge.” The International Herald Tribune 
61 (2004) Cumulative Impact Analysis and Nam Theung 2 Contributions Final Report    - 19 -   
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6  Concluding remarks 
Building  viable  transboundary  water  institutions  for  sustainable  water  management  and 
strengthening  of  existing  cooperation  in  international  basins  is  one  of  mankind’s  great 
challenges. Water resource management requires an interdisciplinary approach and scientists 
from  different  fields  often  have  difficulties  understanding  each  other,  although  the  gap 
between  social  sciences  and  “hard”  sciences  is  narrowing  and  new  theories  are  being 
developed  invented  to  explain  the  complex  interrelationships  between  social  and  natural 
systems. 
Cooperation  over  international  water  is  a  process  depending  on  the  complex  relations 
between relevant actors, ranging from international organizations to individual stakeholders. 
The power to take action is still concentrated at the state level, but solving transboundary 
water issues requires international institutions.  
This paper proposes the use of Complex Adaptive System theory to bridge the gap between 
social systems and ecosystems, and find the attributes of resilient water management models. 
It  proposes  a  simplified  tool  to  measure  both  institutional  and  ecosystem  resilience. 
Resilience is perceived as an ability of a system to recover after a perturbation. If a system is 
represented by a pond of water, the perturbation a stone thrown in to the pond, then system 
resilience is the ability to restore a smooth surface; a steady state of the water in the pond. 
Resilience depends on the structure of the molecules in the fluid, initial conditions and vigor 
power energy of the tossed stone. Water institutions and ecosystems face stressors like those 
described in this paper and their steady state is, in the broad sense, their sustainability. 
Case studies of three international river basins were presented to show examples of stressors, 
and  examination  of  other  watersheds  will  bring  more  examples  to  list.  Once  the  crude 
understanding of responses of human systems and ecosystems to stressors is refined, we can 
design more resilient water institutions or facilitate the emergent behavior of such institutions 
on the level of institutional frameworks.   - 20 -   
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Significant power asymmetry                   
Absence of diplomatic relation between riparian countries                   
Significant dependence on transboundary water resource                   
Generally hostile relations                   
No incentives for cooperation                   
Ideological conflicts                    
Internationalization of river basin                   
International Integration across the basins                    
Disintegration of riparian states                   
Major political shift - Change of government                   
Under representation in RBO                   
NGO and public participations groups dissent                   














Unresolved territory claims                   
Rapid change in population growth rate increase/decrease                   
Unreliable, unavailable water basin data                   
Deterioration of an Economic situation and market changes                   
Privatization                   
Future development of countries                   
Expansion of irrigated land area                   
Neglected water needs of riparian in/after a period of 
instability                   















Increase of water energy demand                   
Draught                   
Flood                   
Erosion                   
Change of ecosystem affecting population in the basin                   
Sedimentation                   
Unstable amplitude of seasonal flow                   
Biophysical changes resulting in decease of water in 
watershed                   
Unsustainable withdrawal in aquifers                    













Deterioration of water quality due to 
industry/sanitation/fertilizing                   
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